The desire to minimize the number of individual new entities postulated is often referred to as quantitative parsimony. Its influence on the default hypotheses formulated by scientists seems undeniable. I argue that there is a wide class of cases for which the preference for quantitatively parsimonious hypotheses is demonstrably rational. The justification, in a nutshell, is that such hypotheses have greater explanatory power than less parsimonious alternatives. My analysis is restricted to a class of cases I shall refer to as (...) additive. Such cases involve the postulation of a collection of qualitatively identical individual objects which collectively explain some particular observed phenomenon. Especially clear examples of this sort occur in particle physics.1Introduction2Particle physics: a case study3Three kinds of simplicity4Explanatory power5Explanation and non‐observation6Parsimony and scientific methodology7Conclusions. (shrink)

Scholars have characterised the trial of the life of pleasure in Philebus 20b-21d as digressive or pejorative. I argue that it is neither: it is a thought experiment containing an important argument, in the form of a reductio, of the hypothesis that a life could be most pleasant without cognition. It proceeds in a series of steps, culminating in the precisely chosen image of the jellyfish. Understanding the intended resonance of this creature, and the sense in which it is deprived, (...) is critical for reconstructing the argument, and yields new insight into Plato’s views on the minimal conditions for pleasure. (shrink)

We read with interest the extended essay published from Riisfeldt and are encouraged by an empirical ethics article which attempts to ground theory and its claims in the real world. However, such attempts also have real-world consequences. We are concerned to read the paper’s conclusion that clinical evidence weakens the distinction between euthanasia and normal palliative care prescribing. This is important. Globally, the most significant barrier to adequate symptom control in people with life-limiting illness is poor access to opioid analgesia. (...) Opiophobia makes clinicians reluctant to prescribe and their patients reluctant to take opioids that might provide significant improvements in quality of life. We argue that the evidence base for the safety of opioid prescribing is broader than that presented, restricting the search to palliative care literature produces significant bias as safety experience and literature for opioids and sedatives exists in many fields. This is not acknowledged in the synthesis presented. By considering additional evidence, we reject the need for agnosticism and reaffirm that palliative opioid prescribing is safe. Second, palliative sedation in a clinical context is a poorly defined concept covering multiple interventions and treatment intentions. We detail these and show that continuous deep palliative sedation (CDPS) is a specific practice that remains controversial globally and is not considered routine practice. Rejecting agnosticism towards opioids and excluding CDPS from the definition of routine care allows the rejection of Riisfeldt’s headline conclusion. On these grounds, we reaffirm the important distinction between palliative care prescribing and euthanasia in practice. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:94 Feminist Studies 45, no. 1. © 2019 by Hannah Baker Saltmarsh Hannah Baker Saltmarsh This Girl I Lost Touch With This girl, who was afraid to enter a room— a girl born in the woods, on moss, whose family dreamt under quilts, who wore dresses that matched anything fabric in the house, even the dresses without loneliness— I held her hand in the corridor-dark until the (...) speaking-in-tongues at the community college dispersed into prayers with too many gerunds and too much fervor that wouldn’t adjust if you got a thousand dollars in the mail or jury duty, faith subtle as a crucifix the size of God on the highway. I waited with her until it was over, although the prayer group was never really over. Over rooms of crowded, faith-based humidity, she loved corridors of woods, the rushes of running away. This girl and I, we were cult-lured, but then the leader stepped down—was it porn, alcohol? He drove us around in a red jeep without doors— the first time I drove in a man’s car, I was eighteen so I fell in love: looking straight ahead together, arm hair touching, the cathedral of autumn anticipating a shape to hold you, the wind that you sometimes hollered over. What happened I can’t see, but when he left the group, I left: the death of visions. Hannah Baker Saltmarsh 95 This girl could long for a man in her fingernails, and, without talking, take a man from his pregnant wife’s side, have his even newer children, this girl who wouldn’t go in a room all alone, walked right in, somewhere we’ve not been, and never left. Monostich in Praise of Four Missed Foul Shots in a Row, Ending with a Line by Shaquille O’Neal —Orlando Magic vs. Houston Rockets, Game 1, NBA Final, 1995 Each mistake at the foul line longs to be its own distinct trip-up, divorced from the tragic-comic failure automatic-reflex of a protagonist on a shame-rampage; each delicate flaw of glass, net, rim wants to be denied once at the charity line, once and only once of red-lipsticked points, the naive purity of one aberrant error in calculation—not bring bleacher-crowds to their feet, posterless hands in the vaulted air before tallying Nick Anderson up as Brick Anderson, most hated NBA player of all time, and by his own fans not believing their own eyes as a series of empty arcs toward scoring dovetails into quadruple humiliations and a goofy smile of gutted hopes and boyish fear-tangled awe that any brain so practiced (for this and what else?) could fail so many times in a row, each fail better and Beckett-harder until the last exit out of obliterating loss is part of the abyss too, unless you are quick on your feet for sports broadcasting... but there is no end to swindled championships if you are a man who’s never had to face the extinction of his early twenties or suck the aftertaste of multi-millionaire juice cocktails poured with a legend’s touch, but in the soapy-sweet glass of your Dixie cup liquor, however close to the sound of Shaq’s name spoken in every language, stares your same lovesick reflection in the welt of that shot-glass mirror, mouthing the bitters of paranoid distraction, unripe manhood, aged ingratitude, and a starless Orlando Magic blue diamond broomed over by nursery-rhyme witches brushing out the cobweb-haze because the crowd is always the same crowd calling you swept... each fumbling error of pressure you let get to you, if only it could be a plotless, lyric monostich without arc, not driven to the plot that is your grave, where the unfaithful, the murderers, liars, and cheaters are defined by threads, no, snapped pieces, of seconds and, as Dante would have it, sorted in hell by a singular thought or deed so 96 Hannah Baker Saltmarsh transformative as to name you; the blue and white jersey on the floor, fists and feet, knees and elbows vacuumed in tantrum, hyped up in the court glare and... (shrink)

A common reading of the Cyrenaics is that they are a school of extreme hedonist presentists, recognising only the pleasure of the present moment, and advising against turning our attention to past or future pleasure or pain. Yet they have some strange advice which tells followers to anticipate future harms in order to lessen the unexpectedness of them when they occur. It’s a puzzle, then, how they can consistently hold the attitude they do to our concern with our present selves, (...) and yet endorse the practise of dwelling on possible future painful scenarios. To establish that this is a puzzle, though, we must first be convinced that the report is true. Cicero is our only clear source for the Cyrenaic advice, and scholars have noted reasons to be suspicious of the reliability of his report. I discuss these doubts, and why they ultimately fail to undermine Cicero’s testimony as a source. Defending Cicero as a source for Cyrenaic thought removes a barrier to taking seriously an aspect of Cyrenaic psychology which could radically alter our understanding of their views. (shrink)

This paper is a response to and discussion of Maddalena Bonelli’s “Women philosophers in antiquity: Open questions and some results.” It also aims to advance the general discussion of the issues Bonelli raises. In it I contextualise Bonelli’s discussion, and take up three of her questions: What is the status of the work of restoring ancient women to the philosophical canon? What criteria ought we to use to decide who counts as a philosopher? What sort of philosophy did women practice (...) in antiquity, and in what ways might the restoration of ancient women thinkers to the canon change the way we conceive of ancient philosophy itself? I consider the way in which Bonelli’s paper advances the discussion of each question, raise some worries about the discussions, and provide suggestions for how we might think about these issues further. I maintain that the reshaping of the philosophical canon that takes place when we integrate ancient women involves a reshaping of the discipline, and of our methods for accessing it. This is a result I argue we ought to embrace rather than resist. I conclude with a summary of the main contributions of Bonelli’s paper. (shrink)

Child abuse is surely the most agonizing psychological issue of our time. We decry the tendency to polarize around the either-or dichotomy of "recovered versus false memories," when both are likely to occur. Memory researchers seem to generalize from the mild, one-shot stressors of the laboratory to the severe repeated traumas reported by abused populations, an inferential leap that is scientifically dubious. Naturalistic studies show some post-traumatic memory impairment ; dissociativity, such as emotional numbing, detachment, and the like; but also (...) increased suggestibility . About 20% of the normal population is highly suggestible, and in these individuals it is trivially easy to show suggested amnesia, detachment, perceptual blocking, etc., as well as to suggest dramatically false memories. It is therefore vital to assess suggestibility and dissociativity in traumatized populations. Adult survivors of abuse may show both more false "memories" and more "false forgetting" than the normal population. (shrink)

Beginning in 2002, Wells Fargo began opening fraudulent accounts for unsuspecting customers. Stakeholders at every level either participated in, ignored, or tolerated the bank’s behavior that defrauded consumers on a massive scale. These unethical and well-documented schemes spanned more than a decade. Using public sources, this case recounts the events and ethical lapses that unfolded over the multiyear investigation of the Wells Fargo fraudulent accounts scandal and illuminates the general systemic failures of corporate culture and governance, public regulation, and market (...) responses to promote ethical business practices. This case provides the opportunity to consider what means for fostering ethical conduct might exist if a corporation can be big enough and rich enough that civil, criminal, regulatory, and market forces cannot deter unethical corporate practices, and if the market does not punish the corporation for a culture that promotes fraud. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 124.4 (2003) 617-620 [Access article in PDF] ROSANNA OMITOWOJU. Rape and the Politics of Consentin Classical Athens. Cambridge Classical Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. x + 249 pp. Cloth, $60. This book is an account of the treatment of heterosexual rape and related topics (e.g., the status of women, adultery) in two Athenian genres: forensic oratory and New Comedy. Omitowoju focuses primarily on the (...) issue of consent, a central concern of modern discussions. She demonstrates that this concern is largely absent from the ancient discourse, which effectively leaves the victim out of the picture and conforms to the silencing of women in ancient social contexts. Omitowoju does not emphasize this point, but the structure of her argument makes it clear, as does her sustained focus on the dependent status of the female "citizeness" (her term for demotis, politis, and aste gune, 23-26). She rightly insists, for instance, that the subject of rape cannot be addressed properly without reference to that central concern of Athenian men: what makes one a good citizen, and therefore who gets to enjoy citizen status. This valuable insight shapes Omitowoju's argument as a whole and should be taken seriously as a means of framing future discussions. Although the general introduction fails to situate this argument in relation to other analyses of rape in the field of classical studies, rehearsing instead some familiar notions from modern discussions, this move serves to highlight the primary differences (and disturbing similarities) between ancient and modern handling of the subject. We thereby notice, for example, that modern cases often still give too much weight to the respective statuses of the perpetrator and the victim, as if to excuse the former and blame the latter.The book is divided into two sections: the first scans forensic speeches for terminology that might relate to rape charges, and the second looks at Menander's comedies in order to assess their contributions to a reconstruction of attitudes toward rape. Omitowoju begins her discussion (after the general introduction) with a review of the forensic setting, including such essential elements as the difference between public and private charges (graphai vs. dikai) and the paucity of legal vocabulary for identifying types of "insolence" (hubris) or "violence" (bia) as rape. She also briefly considers the problems with treating texts composed by speechwriters (logographoi) as historical documents, a methodological difficulty that receives more attention in the Menander section. The discussion then turns to issues of citizenship and the "politicisation" of rape, which emerge as the central concerns of the first section. Omitowoju argues that because the Athenian woman had no "legal personality," her consent to any sexual encounter could not be distinguished from that of her male guardian (kurios) (25).This is an important point, and Omitowoju lays out the ramifications of this absence of women from the legal scene in some detail. It explains why the issue of consent is missing from the ancient discussion: if a female victim of sexual violence has no subjectivity from the legal perspective, then her response to the attack cannot even be expressed in the idiom. The only relevant legal [End Page 617] issues are whether she has a citizen kurios and is capable of giving birth to citizen children, in which case any sexual violence committed against her could be punishable by fines or even death. The charge of rape may not have been legally recognized if the woman in question was of lower status (e.g., a slave or courtesan [hetaira]), since in that case she may have a master but not necessarily one who would have an interest in defending her from sexual predation (80-81).Such distinctions emerge more fully in the course of the three chapters that divide the forensic material in relation to three terms with legal force: hubris, bia, and moicheia. The first two of these chapters address how charges of outrage and violence overlap with those of rape, while the third considers the problem of distinguishing adulterous liaisons from those involving sexual assault. Moicheia may refer to... (shrink)

A collection of 17 meditative essays and 52 weekly reflections, this book is for readers who are concerned about the daunting future humankind has created and who seek inspiration, wisdom, and spiritual purpose in the face of the collapse of industrial civilization.

The author contends that the analogies between "the logical roles of singular and universal statements" are important but do not "justify the conclusion that singular statements are reducible to propositions" of the forms a, E, I, And o. (staff).

This paper maintains that forgiveness of one human by another is not a merely personal transaction, but is social or public in nature. This leads to a better grasp of interpersonal forgiveness, and makes it easier to recognize and understand political acts of forgiveness. Such an understanding explains, and possibly reinterprets, the special authority of the victim to forgive. The victim’s authority is puzzling, given that most offenses are not merely personal, but are moral. This puzzle prompts a turn towards (...) the moral community, and it places the notion of reconciliation, and the desire to restore human relations at the center of the concept. Reconciliation by itself is not, however, forgiveness, and any adequate analysis must recognize as crucial both judgments about, and attitudes toward, the offender’s character. Nonetheless, forgiveness is not simply a subjective story to be told in terms of an individual’s psychological strengths or weaknesses. We need to examine public and political acts of forgiveness also. An account of political acts of forgiveness might well help us to be clearer about the nature of individual forgiving. Keywords: public morality, public forgiveness, reconciliation, victim’s authority. (shrink)

Excerpt from Outlines of Logic, Psychology and Ethics The following pages do not lay claim to originality of thought, or even of language. But they cover the whole ground of the Mental and Moral Philosophy Course for the London University Pass B.A., and, in manuscript form, have been found useful by students preparing for that examination. In later years the questions on each branch of the course appear to have been set from a constantly enlarging circle of text-books; and the (...) student who confines himself to one or two authorities, however excellent these may be, is sure to meet with many questions for which he is totally unprepared; while, if he extends the range of his reading, he is very likely to concentrate his attention on what is superfluous and, for his immediate purpose, without value. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

In this book, Mark Rowlands challenges the Cartesian view of the mind as a self-contained monadic entity, and offers in its place a radical externalist or environmentalist model of cognitive processes. Drawing on both evolutionary theory and a detailed examination of the processes involved in perception, memory, thought and language use, Rowlands argues that cognition is, in part, a process whereby creatures manipulate and exploit relevant objects in their environment. This innovative book provides a foundation for an unorthodox but increasingly (...) popular view of the nature of cognition. (shrink)